ABSTRACT. We investigate the relation between monotonicity and the no-show paradox in voting rules. Although the literature has established their logical independence, we show, by presenting logical dependency results, that the two conditions are closer than a general logical independency result would suggest. Our analysis is made both under variable and fixed-size electorates.
INTRODUCTION
Among the countless contributions of Hervé Moulin to our enlightenment on the collective decision making problem, his research on the axiomatic analysis of social choice rules presents a distinguished chapter which inspired generations of scholars. We view this issue of Mathematical Social Sciences dedicated to him as a nice opportunity to revisit the connection between participation and monotonicity, two conditions of social choice theory which have been much elaborated by the fine work of Hervé Moulin.
Moulin [1988, 1991] defines participation as the vanishing of the no-show paradox introduced by Fishburn and Brams [1983] : a social choice rule exhibits the no-show paradox when the vote casted by an additional voter changes the outcome in a way which makes this new-comer worse off compared to the case he had not shown up. Thus, the paradox can be viewed as a way to manipulate social choice rules by abstaining to vote, such as Moulin [1991] who sees it as a particular case of manipulation by truncation of preferences as defined by Fishburn and Brams [1984] .
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Such views, however, necessitate some caution on how the new-comer/abstainer is interpreted. Here, two approaches come to the fore: One is the fixed-electorate approach where the number of voters are fixed and the abstainers are those voters who express full indifference over the set of alternatives. So a "new-comer" is an individual who is an incumbent member of the society who moves away from his full indifference position. The other approach necessitates a variable-electorate, as the new-comer is a voter who earlier was not a member of the society, hence "abstaining" means his altogether departing from the society to which he used to be part of.
Rejecting to express a preference does not mean to leave the electorate. As a result, the two interpretations have different meanings. However, for social choice rules which are "regular", i.e., ignore voters who show up without expressing a preference, one could expect that the choice of the interpretation would not matter. Theorem 14 somehow justifies this expectation by establishing an equivalence between variable and fixed electorate social choice rules regarding the satisfaction of PART. 1 On the other hand, the choice of the interpretation has implications on the relationship between the no-show paradox and monotonicity -a fact that we discuss in the sequel. However, we wish to note right away that the literature on the paradox has almost always adopted the variable-electorate approach, including and perhaps following the seminal paper of Moulin [1988] . 2 We start, in Section 2, by considering the paradox under this standard variableelectorate interpretation and revisit its relation to a well-known monotonicity condition of social choice theory. Monotonicity, broadly speaking, requires that an "improvement" of the status of an alternative in the preferences of the electorate should result in a "raising" of the status of this alternative as the social outcome. It is clear that, different meanings can be attributed to "improvement" and "raising", each of which leading to a different definition of monotonicity. In fact, the literature exhibits a plethora of monotonicity conditions. As all of these can be connected to the (non)-manipulability of social choice rules, the logical relationship of participation to those monotonicity conditions stands out as an interesting question.
Among the various monotonicity conditions, perhaps the simplest and oldest known is the one we consider
While most of the well-known social choice rules are regular, there are notable exceptions such as those who use a quorum or those who allow voters to vote for "none of the above (NOTA)". A specific analysis of these rules, though out of the scope of this paper, can contribute to our understanding of the notion of abstention. We thank the associate editor who draw our attention to this.
2
The paradox has also been considered in the framework of judgement aggregation (see Balinski and Laraki [2010] ).
MON: Raising an alternative x in voters' preferences while leaving the rankings otherwise unchanged can never result in x becoming the loser while x was initially the winner.
Although normatively appealing and simple, MON is violated by various wellknown social choice rules, in particular by all point run-off systems (Smith [1973] ).
4
As participation (PART) is also violated by an interesting class of social choice rules, namely those which are Condorcet consistent (Moulin [1988] ), the logical relationship between MON and PART turns out to be of further interest.
In fact, the general logical independence between MON and PART is already established. The question is addressed by Nurmi [1999] A fairer question is whether MON implies PART under mild consistency requirements over the behavior of social choice rules in different electorates. One such condition is reinforcement, also known as consistency, which requires that alternatives which are separately chosen by both of two disjoint electorates must form the choice made by the union of these electorates (Smith [1973] , Young [1974 Young [ , 1975 
)).
A much milder version of reinforcement is homogeneity which requires that an alternative which is chosen by some given electorate must also be chosen when this electorate is replicated. 5 We show that in the two-alternative case, under the homogeneity assumption, MON implies PART. 4 Other interesting violations of MON are established by Fishburn [1977] , Richelson [1980] ,Fishburn and Brams [1983] . 5 Without omitting to note some borderline counter examples in Fishburn [1977] , we can nevertheless say that almost all social choice rules considered in the literature are homogeneous.
With three or more alternatives, Moulin [1988] , while establishing the logical independence between PART and reinforcement, uses a threshold scoring rule to exemplify the satisfaction of reinforcement and the failure of PART. As all threshold scoring rules satisfy MON, the example also shows that even when homogeneity is replaced by reinforcement, MON fails to imply PART.
Inspired by this example we devote further attention to threshold scoring rules 6 and ask whether they always fail PART. The answer is almost affirmative: we show that, except one member, the class of threshold scoring rules fails PART.
We also consider a weaker version of participation (WPART) as the absence of a stronger version of the no-show paradox (Pérez [2001] Section 4 makes some closing remarks. 6 One can see Saari [1990] for an analysis of these rules.
THE VARIABLE POPULATION CASE
We consider a finite set of alternatives A with #A ≥ 2. N denotes the set of natural numbers. For each n ∈ N, we define N = {1, . . . , n} ⊂ N as the n-voter electorate, where each v ∈ N is a voter. Π stands for the set of linear orders over A. P v ∈ Π is the preference of v ∈ N over A, where for any distinct x, y ∈ A, xP v y indicates that voter v prefers x to y. 7 We write P N = {P v } v∈N for a preference profile over A.
A social choice rule (SCR) is a mapping F that returns, for each n ∈ N and each P N ∈ Π N , a single alternative F(P N ) ∈ A. So the SCRs we consider are variableelectorate in the sense of being defined for every number of voters and they satisfy the full domain condition in the sense that given any electorate, they are defined for every possible preference profile.
For any two electorates N = {1, . . . , n} and M = {1, . . . , m}, we define the joint electorate M ⊕N = {1, . . . , m+n}. Note that ⊕ is commutative. Now letting m ≤ n, for any two profiles R N , Q M , we let P N⊕M = (R N ,Q M ) stand for the profile of M ⊕ N where
. . , n} and P n+v = Q v ∀v ∈ {1, . . . , m}. Note that when m < n, P M⊕N is uniquely defined by setting the first n voters as the voters of N and the remaining Definition 1. A SCR F satisfies participation (PART) iff ∀N with n ≥ 2, ∀v ∈ N,
Definition 2. Given any N, any x and any P N , P N such that P v P v for some v ∈ N and P w = P w ∀w ∈ N \ {v}, we say that P N is an improvement for x w.r.t. P N if
(1) xP v y =⇒ xP v y for every y ∈ A \ {x}, (2) yP v z ⇐⇒ yP v z for every y, z ∈ A \ {x}.
Since P v is a linear order it is complete, asymmetric and transitive. So, by completeness, for any distinct x, y ∈ A, we have xP v y or yP v x. Moreover, since P v is asymmetric, ∀x, y ∈ A xP v y =⇒ y¬P v x. Furthermore, if xP v y and yP v z then xP v z by transitivity. 8 The definition of MON applies just to profiles that differ by a single voter's preference, since our focus is on its relation to PART which is defined with respect to the addition of a single voter. However, it should be noted that our definition is equivalent to the more common definition in the literature where MON applies also to profiles which possibly differ in a group of voters' preferences. Proof. Let A := {x, y}. Take some F which satisfies PART but fails MON. So ∃ N, v,
x, giving a contradiction.
Q.E.D.
The reverse implication holds, when a mild homogeneity condition is assumed.
For any positive integer m, and any profile P N , we write mP N for any of the profiles Proof. Let A := {x, y}. Assume that F satisfies HOM and MON but fails PART.
Since F fails PART, there is some N with #N := n ≥ 2, some profile P N and some voter v ∈ N with xP v y while F(P N −v ) = x and F(P N ) = y. Let #{v ∈ N | xP v y} := k and #{v ∈ N | yP v x} := n−k. Consider now the profiles nP N −v and (n−1)P N . Due to HOM, it follows that F(nP N −v ) = x and F((n − 1)P N ) = y. Moreover, both profiles have the same number n(n − 1) of voters. Yet, they differ on the number of voters who prefer x to y: there are nk − n voters who prefer x to y in nP N −v and nk − k in (n − 1)P N .
Hence, there is some profile (n − 1)P N which is an improvement for x w.r.t. some
giving a contradiction.
However, it should be noted that MON does not imply PART without HOM, as the following proposition shows.
Proposition 1. Let #A := 2. There exists some SCR F that satisfies MON and fails PART.
9 Note that mP N is equivalent to P N⊕N⊕...⊕N . As here, ⊕ is applied to sets of equal size, mP N is not uniquely defined.
Proof. Let A := {x, y}. We construct some F that satisfies MON but fails PART (and HOM, by Theorem 2). When #N is even, let
words, when #N is even, F is the majority rule biased towards x in the event of tie and when #N is odd F is the unanimity rule biased towards y in the absence of a unanimously agreed alternative. It is clear that F satisfies MON. Let P N be a profile with two out of three voters who prefer x to y and one voter who prefers y to x. Thus, there is some P v ∈ Π with xP v y. It follows that F(P N −v ) = x and F(P N ) = y.
2.2. The case of three or more alternatives.
On the implication of PART by MON. We start by showing that PART is not
implied by MON even under the following reinforcement condition.
Definition 5. A SCR F satisfies reinforcement (REIN) if for any pair of electorates
M and N, for any P M , P N and for any x ∈ A,
Assuming anonymity and neutrality, the conjunction of REIN with a few mild conditions characterizes scoring rules (Smith [1973] , Young [1974 , 1975 ], Myerson [1995 ). In fact, one can see REIN as a core condition for being a scoring rule.
On the other hand, Saari [1990] presents a weaker version of REIN and shows that threshold scoring rules represent a class of SCRs that fail REIN but satisfy its weak version. For single-valued SCRs, the strong and the weak versions of the condition coincide. Since scoring rules satisfy PART, we now show our claim through a threshold scoring rule.
For any preference P v and any alternative x, the rank of x in P v equals r(x; P v ) = Definition 6. Every score vector s induces a threshold scoring rule F which is defined for every N and every P N as F(P N ) = {x ∈ A | S(x; P N ; s) ≥ t(N, A, s)}. When Threshold scoring rules are well-defined since, by the choice of t(N, A, s), F(P N )
is not empty for every P N . The next lemma proves this point formally.
Lemma 1. If F is a threshold scoring rule, F(P N ) is not empty for every P N .
Proof. Assume by contradiction that there is some profile P N for which F(P N ) is empty. Thus, S(x; P N , s) < t(N, A, s) for any x ∈ A. It follows that x∈A S(x; P N , s) < 
We now ask whether all threshold scoring rules fail PART. The answer is almost affirmative as the theorem below shows. 
Proof. Take some threshold scoring rule F with score vector s. Suppose PART fails so F(P N −v ) = x and F(P N −v , P v ) = y with xP v y for some N, v, P N −v and P v . This can occur under one of the following two exhaustive cases.
Case 2: ∃y x with S(y,
#A . A necessary and sufficient condition to avoid case 1 is that the lowest additional score that x receives with the arrival of v is at least #A i=1 s i #A . As xP v y, hence r(x; P v ) ≥ #A − 1, this is ensured by setting
A necessary and sufficient condition to avoid case 2, it is that the highest additional score that y gets with the arrival of v does not exceed #A i=1 s i #A . As xP v y, hence r(y; P v ) ≤ 2, this is ensured by setting
10 This example is equivalent to the one discussed by Moulin [1988] 
Note that WPART is equivalent to PART with just two alternatives whereas it is weaker with more than two alternatives: PART requires that when adding the vote of v, voter v prefers F(P N −v , P v ) to F(P N −v ), whereas WPART just requires the existence of some alternative that v prefers to F(P N −v ).
We now show that MON does not imply WPART either, even when combined with REIN. Proof. Take some weakly unanimous F that satisfies REIN. If it fails WPART, there
As z is first ranked in P v , by weak unanimity, F(P v ) = z. By REIN, it follows that F(P N −v , P v ) = z, which leads to a contradiction.
Q.E.D.
It is worth noting that WPART is also studied by Richelson [1980] by asking that the lifted alternative must be raised from the bottom of the ranking.
Definition 9. Given any N, any x and any P N , P N such that P v P v for some v ∈ N and P w = P w ∀w ∈ N \ {v}, we say that P N is a strong improvement for x w.r.t. P N if
(1) yP v x for every y ∈ A \ {x},
(2) yP v z ⇐⇒ yP v z for every y, z ∈ A \ {x}.
The following is a weakening of MON because the definition of improvement is strengthened but also because it allows alternatives above the lifted alternative to be chosen. As in the case of WPART and PART, it turns out that WMON and MON are equivalent with just two alternatives.
Definition 10. A SCR F is weakly monotonic (WMON) iff given x ∈ A , P N , P N ∈ Π N such that P N is a strong improvement for x w.r.t. P N :
Theorem 5. Let #A ≥ 3. If a SCR F satisfies PART, then it satisfies WMON.
Proof. Take some F that satisfies PART but violates WMON. Since WMON fails, there exist some N, v ∈ N, P N , P N with P v P v where (P N −v , P v ) is a strong improvement for x with respect to (P N −v , P v ), while F(P N −v , P v ) = x and F(P N −v , P v ) = y with xP v y. Due to PART,
we have F(P N −v , P v ) y, giving a contradiction.
It should be noted that WMON is not too weak: it is able to discriminate among the SCRs that fail MON. For instance, one can check that the examples described in Campbell and Kelly [2002] which fail MON do satisfy WMON, which is the case by Theorem 5, as they all satisfy PART. On the other hand, plurality with a runoff, well known to fail MON, fails WMON as well, as we illustrate through the example below.
Example 1: Let A := {x, y, z} and consider two profiles P N , P N with eight voters such that P N is a strong improvement for z w.r.t. to P N :
Under plurality with a runoff where ties are broken in favor of y, at P N , x and z which are both first ranked by three voters go for a runoff and, since there is a majority of voters who prefer z to x, we have F(P N ) = z. At P N , z is first ranked by four voters whereas both x and y are ranked first by two voters each. As ties are broken in favor of y, y and z go for a runoff where F(P N ) = y. However, this violates WMON since P N is a strong improvement for z w.r.t. to P N and F(P N ) = z.
In fact, the observation made by the example above reflects a more general fact:
all point runoff procedures but one fail WMON. To see this, we first remark that when there are precisely three alternatives, every point runoff procedure eliminates the alternative with the lowest score according to some score vector (1, λ, 0) with 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 (we assume that ties are broken alphabetically). There are, hence, 3n 1 + 3n 2 + 4 voters in the profile P N . It follows that there are n 1 − n 2 +2 more voters who prefer x to y than y to x and that there are n 1 − n 2 more voters who prefer z to x than x to z. We let n 1 > n 2 .
For any runoff procedure with vector (1, λ, 0), the score that each alternative receives from the first six groups is equal to η = (n 1 +n 2 )(1+λ). It follows that the score for the alternatives at P N equals s(x) = η + 2 + λ, s(y) = η + 1 + 2λ and s(z) = η + 1 + λ so that s(x) > s(y) ≥ s(z) as long as λ < 1 2 and s(x) ≥ s(y) > s(z) when λ > 1 2 . Breaking ties alphabetically, x, y go for a runoff and x is the winner under any runoff procedure since x is majority preferred to y by the choice of n 1 , n 2 .
We now show that WMON fails as long as λ Consider the profile P N such that the only difference with P N is that k of the n 1 voters with preference yP v zP v x, raise x to the top and switch to xP v yP v z. P N is a strong improvement for x w.r.t. P N . Letting s (·) be the scores of the alternatives
and z go for a runoff. It is possible to pick such a k and n 1 − n 2 arbitrarily large, so that z is majority winner against x at P N as well, showing that any runoff procedure with λ < 1 2 fails WMON. The case for λ > 1 2 is similar to the previous one: it suffices to construct a profile P N such that the only difference with P N is that k of the n 2 voters with preference The proof of Theorem 6 suggests that runoff procedures under Borda scores satisfy WMON, which we present as a conjecture. Nevertheless, we use Theorem 6 to show that no point runoff procedure satisfies PART.
Theorem 7. Let #A ≥ 3. Every point runoff procedure fails PART.
Proof. Note that, when #A = 3, any runoff procedure with λ 1 2 fails WMON (Theorem 6) and hence, due to Theorem 5, fails PART. Hence, the only runoff rule that might satisfy PART is the one with λ = 1 2 . To see that this rule also fails PART, take the profile P N as defined in the proof of Theorem 6, where, letting λ = 1 2 , we have s(x) = η + 2.5, s(y) = η + 2 and s(z) = η + 1.5 so that x wins. Consider the profile (P N , P v ) where xP v zP v y. Now, the scores are s (x) = η + 3.5, s (y) = η + 2 and s (z) = η+2. If the tie between y and z is broken in favor of z, x and z go for a runoff, which leads to the victory of z, showing the failure of PART.
A partial characterization of PART.
While we mainly focus on the connection between PART and MON, this section gives a partial characterization of PART through a lower contour set intersection property, which we call Condition λ.
11
For any P v and any alternative x, let L(x; P v ) = {y ∈ A | xP v y} denote the set of alternatives such that x is at least as good as any of them under P v (the lower contour set of x under P v ).
Definition 11. A SCR F satisfies Condition λ if for any P N −v the following holds:
Building on this condition, we now provide two sets of results: the first one deals with the relation of Condition λ with PART whereas the second one focuses on its relation with MON. 11 We thank the associate editor for suggesting this nice extension.
To start with, we prove that PART and Condition λ are almost equivalent.
Theorem 8. If a SCR F satisfies PART, then F satisfies Condition λ.
Proof. Take some F that satisfies PART. Therefore, ∀v ∈ N, Now, in order to state our claim, we introduce half-way monotonicity as defined by Sanver and Zwicker [2009] . For any linear order P v over A, we let rev(P v ) be the linear order obtained by reversing P v so that xP v y iff y rev(P v )x for any pair x, y of alternatives.
Definition 12.
A SCR F is half-way monotonic (HMON), if for any N, any v ∈ N, any P v , P N −v and any x, y ∈ A:
HMON can be interpreted as follows: a rule that violates HMON can be manipulated by some voter who completely misrepresents his preference, in the sense of announcing a preference that reverses every possible pairwise comparison among alternatives.
Lemma 2. If a SCR F satisfies Condition λ, then F satisfies HMON.
Proof. Take some F that fails HMON. Therefore, there exists some P N −v and some pair x, y ∈ A with x = F(P N −v , P v ) and y = F(P N −v , rev(P v )) with yP v x. However, As a corollary to Theorem 8 and Theorem 9, we obtain Moulin [1988] 's result that no Condorcet extension satisfies PART.
The converse of Theorem 8 does not hold as proved by the next result. Now, in order to prove that the converse of Theorem 8 holds provided that some mild conditions are added, we introduce the reversal cancellation property. Reversal cancellation, as defined by Sanver and Zwicker [2009] , is arguably quite mild:
according to it, adding a linear order and its reversal should leave the outcome of the SCR unchanged.
Definition 13. A SCR F satisfies Reversal Cancellation (RC) if for any N, any v ∈ N, any P v and any P N ∈ Π N :
The next proposition shows that, combined with HOM and RC, Condition λ implies PART.
Theorem 10. Let #A ≥ 3. If a SCR F satisfies Condition λ, HOM and RC, then F satisfies PART.
Proof. Take some SCR F that fails PART. Therefore, there exists some P N −v and
However, L(x; rev(P v )) ∩ L(y; P v ) = since xP v y by definition and rev(P v ) is the reversal linear order of P v . Hence F fails Condition λ, which concludes the proof.
To see why RC cannot be dropped with more than three alternatives, it suffices to consider the voting rule described by the proof of Proposition 4: this rule satisfies HOM and Condition λ but fails both RC and PART. With two alternatives, RC is not anymore needed. Indeed, Condition λ is equivalent to MON as will be shown by Theorem 12 below. Therefore, using Theorem 2, one can see that Condition λ jointly with HOM implies PART in this case.
Once we have shown the almost equivalence of PART and Condition λ, this final set of results studies the relationship between Condition λ and MON. We first show that both conditions are logically independent with at least three alternatives. Proof. Let A := {x, y}. Take some F that satisfies Condition λ but fails MON. So, ∃N, v, P N −v , P v , P v with xP v y, yP v x while F(P N −v , P v ) = y and F(P N −v , P v ) = x. However, this implies that L(y; P v ) = {y} whereas L(x; P v ) = {x} so that Condition λ fails, a contradiction.
Take now some F that satisfies MON. So,
that Condition λ holds again. Therefore, it must be the case that Proof. Take some SCR F that fails WMON but satisfies Condition λ. Since F fails WMON, there must exist P N −v , P v , P v and x, y such that F(P N −v , P v ) = x and F(P N −v , P v ) = y with x ranked last at P v and y ranked below x at P v . Hence L(x, P v ) = {x} whereas x ∉ L(y, P v ) since y ranked below x. But this implies that F fails Condition λ since the previous equalities imply that L(
THE FIXED ELECTORATE CASE
We now consider the case where the electorate N is of fixed size n ≥ 2. A voter v is now allowed to have as preference a linear order P v ∈ Π or to abstain, i.e. have full indifference over the whole set of alternatives. This indifference is denoted by the null preference R 0 where xR 0 y holds for any x, y ∈ A. We let Π := Π ∪ {R 0 }. The Given any n ∈ N, a fixed-size social choice rule (FSCR) is a mapping F n that returns, for P N ∈ Π N , a single alternative F n (P N ) ∈ A. Note that the full domain assumption prevails, i.e. given the fixed electorate N, F n is defined for every possible preference profile P N .
We now define MON under the possibility of abstention in individual preferences.
Definition 14.
Given any x and any P N , P N with P v P v for some v ∈ N and P w = P w ∀w ∈ N \ {v}, If P v R 0 , then P N is an improvement for x w.r.t. P N if
If P v = R 0 , then P N is an improvement for x w.r.t. P N if
(1) xP v y for every y ∈ A \ {x}.
Definition 15. A FSCR F n is monotonic (MON) iff given x ∈ A , P N , P N ∈ Π N such that P N is an improvement for x w.r.t. P N ,
We now define PART in this framework.
We now establish an equivalence between the fixed and variable electorate interpretations regarding the satisfaction of PART. We start by giving two definitions.
Definition 17. A family of FSCRs {F n } n∈N is equivalent to a variable electorate SCR F if and only if for any n ∈ N and any P N ∈ Π N , F n (P N ) = F(P N ).
Definition 18. A family of FSCRs {F n } n∈N is regular if for any n ∈ N, for any P N ∈ Π N with P i = R 0 for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, F n (P N ) = F n (P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P i−1 , P i+1 , . . . , P n ).
The meaning of Definition 17 is clear. The idea behind regularity is to ignore voters who take part in the election without expressing a preference; this is satisfied by many well-known rules such as scoring rules and the Condorcet principle.
Nevertheless, the quorum rules (see Houy [2009] Proof. Take some SCR F and its equivalent regular family of FSCRs {F n } n∈N .
Assume that F satisfies PART. Due to Definition 17, it follows that for any n ≥ 2,
Moreover, Definition 18 implies that
the previous equalities imply that, as long as
which proves that F n satisfies PART for any n ∈ N.
Assume now that each F n satisfies PART. Again Definitions 17 and 18 jointly imply that
Since each F n satisfies PART, it follows that
However, combining the previous implication with the described equivalence between the SCR F and each FSCR F n , proves that F satisfies PART, as desired.
Q.E.D.
By using Theorem 14 we can transfer results on the satisfaction of PART in the variable electorate setting to the fixed electorate one. More precisely, Moulin [1988] proves that with four or more alternatives and with at least 25 voters, no Condorcet rule satisfies PART. Recently, Brandt et al. [2016] proves that the minimal number of voters to obtain this incompatibility is exactly 12 using computational Example: PART does not imply MON. Fix some x ∈ A. We define a FSCR F n such that, for any profile
x is ranked last by every P v R 0 , then F n (P N ) = x and (3) if there is some P v R 0 where some alternative y different from x is ranked last, then F n selects the most preferred alternative of the voter with the lowest index among those with a strict preference where x is not ranked last. One can check that F n satisfies PART but fails MON.
As the following theorem states, for FSCRs, MON and PART are equivalent when there are two alternatives only. and some pair P v , P v with yP v x and xP v y with F n (P N −v , P v ) = x and F n (P N −v , P v ) = y. However, due to PART,
Case 2: there exist some profile
and some pair P v = R 0 , P v with
PART implies F n (P N −v , P v ) = x, giving a contradiction. We leave the reader to check that MON implies PART.
We now define WPART in the fixed electorate framework.
12 For a recent contribution on the No-Show paradox with social choice correspondences, see Brandl et al. [2015] .
Theorem 16. Let #A ≥ 3. If a FSCR F n satisfies MON, then it satisfies WPART.
Proof. Take some F n that fails WPART. Since F n fails WPART, there must some
and some pair P v , P v = R 0 with xP v z ∀z ∈ A\{x} while F n (P N −v , P v ) = x and F n (P N −v , P v ) x. As (P N −v , P v ) is an improvement for x w.r.t. (P N −v , P v ), this violates MON and concludes the proof.
The following is the weakening of MON in the same spirit as the weakening introduced in Section 2.
Definition 20. Given any x and any P N , P N such that P v P v for some v ∈ N and P w = P w ∀w ∈ N \ {v}, If P v R 0 , then P N is a strong improvement for x w.r.t. P N if
If P v = R 0 , then P N is a strong improvement for x w.r.t. P N if
Definition 21. A FSCR F n is weakly monotonic (WMON) iff given x ∈ A , P N , P N ∈ Π N such that P N is a strong improvement for x w.r.t. P N x = F n (P N ) and F n (P N ) F n (P N ) =⇒ F n (P N )P v x.
Theorem 17. Let #A ≥ 3. If a FSCR F n satisfies PART, then it satisfies WMON.
Proof. Take some F n that satisfies PART but fails WMON. Since F n fails WMON, one of the following two exhaustive cases holds.
Case 1: there exist some profile P N −v ∈ Π N −v and some pair P v , P v with zP v x∀z ∈ A \ {x} and xP v y with F n (P N −v , P v ) = x and F n (P N −v , P v ) = y. However, due to PART, F n (P N −v , P v ) = x implies F n (P N −v , R 0 ) = x which in turn implies F n (P N −v , P v ) y, giving a contradiction.
Case 2: there exist some profile P N −v ∈ Π N −v and some pair P v = R 0 , P v with xP v z∀z x while F n (P N −v , P v ) = x and F n (P N −v , P v ) = y. However, due to PART, F n (P N −v , R 0 ) = x implies F n (P N −v , P v ) = x, giving a contradiction.
Thus, there is no F n satisfying PART but failing WMON, which concludes the proof.
Q.E.D.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Although the logical independence between the no-show paradox and the failure of monotonicity has already been observed, our findings suggest that this observation does not mean a major conceptual gap between the two conditions. In fact, under two different interpretations of "a new-comer to the society", we are able to present instances where participation and monotonicity get very close to each other -in some particular cases to the extent that the established general logical independence between them vanishes.
This closeness is rather expected to us because, as we discuss in the introduction, both conditions are related to the manipulability of SCRs. In fact, until their logical independence was established by Nurmi [1999] and Campbell and Kelly [2002] , there was a prevailing intuition that the two conditions were somehow related, in particular that PART could imply MON (see, for example, Nurmi [1999] , p.62).
Our findings point to a wisdom in this intuition: Although Campbell and Kelly [2002] show that PART does not imply MON, as the unorthodoxy of their examples suggests, PART almost implies MON, more precisely implies its weaker version WMON. On the other hand, as our Proposition 3 suggests, the fact that MON does not imply PART is not a mere consequence of the fact that PART is a condition for SCRs defined over variable size societies while MON is not.
Our discussions on the relationship between PART and MON paved the way to general results on certain interesting classes of SCRs. In particular, we show that all threshold scoring rules but one fail PART; all point runoff procedures but one (namely Borda) fail WMON; and all point runoff procedures fail PART.
It is worth noting that although the fixed-electorate interpretation has no considerable effect on the class of social choice rules that satisfy PART, it results in MON and PART getting closer. This is also rather expected because, again as discussed in the introduction, under this interpretation the link between the no-show paradox and manipulability of SCRs is more direct. A point we wish to emphasize is the equivalence between PART and MON under the fixed-electorate interpretation, when there are two alternatives. In this framework, majority rules with quorums are known to fail MON and they are supposed to give room to manipulation by abstention (see Houy [2009] ). Our Theorem 15 is a formal expression of this supposition.
Finally, we wish to remark that PART has been mostly considered in the literature for single-valued SCRs which led our analysis to be held in this framework.
However, there are a relatively few considerations of PART for multi-valued SCRs, such as Jimeno et al. [2009] , and how our analysis would carry to that framework
remains as an open question.
